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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies occurring in China (except Hong Kong, Macao Special Administrative Regions and Taiwan Province, the same below) or possibly imported from outside China in February 2023. Methods: Based on various data and departmental notification information on domestic and foreign public health emergencies reports and surveillance of key infectious diseases, the expert consultation method was used and experts from provincial (autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) centers for disease prevention and control were invited to participate in the assessment by video conference. Results: The number of public health emergencies to be reported in February 2023 is expected to increase compared to former month. In February 2023, affected by immune escape and reinfection of Omicron variants XBB, CH and other possible emerging subtypes, it is expected that the COVID-19 may become endemic in more areas of the world. In China, because of the increased flow of people after the Spring Festival and the opening of schools, the possibility of the spread of the virus will increase. The influenza viruses activity level may increase in February, and influenza A (H1N1) is more likely to be the main influenza virus. Conclusion: Special attention is given to COVID-19, and general attention is given to seasonal influenza.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies occurring in the mainland of China or possibly imported from outside China in January 2023. Methods: Based on various data and departmental notification information on domestic and foreign public health emergencies reports and surveillance of key infectious diseases, the expert consultation method was used and experts from provincial (autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government) centers for disease prevention and control were invited to participate in the assessment by video conference. Results: The number of public health emergencies reported in January 2023 is expected to increase or be similar to that reported in December 2022. The COVID-19 rebound in the northern hemisphere is likely to continue in January 2023 due to immune escape of BQ, XBB and other possible emerging Omicron variants' subtypes. The increased migration of people in Chinese mainland during the Spring Festival in 2023 could increase the risk of the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 among uninfected people. The level of influenza virus activity is likely to increase in January, and influenza A is likely to dominate. January 2023 remains risky month for nonoccupational carbon monoxide poisoning. Conclusion: Special attention is given to COVID-19, and general attention is given to seasonal influenza and nonoccupational carbon monoxide poisoning.
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Introduction: The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has generated 2,431 variants over the course of its global transmission over the past 3 years. To better evaluate the genomic variation of SARS-CoV-2 before and after the optimization of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) prevention and control strategies, we analyzed the genetic evolution branch composition and genomic variation of SARS-CoV-2 in both domestic and imported cases in China (the data from Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions and Taiwan, China were not included) from September 26, 2022 to January 29, 2023. Methods: Analysis of the number of genome sequences, sampling time, dynamic changes of evolutionary branches, origin, and clinical typing of SARS-CoV-2 variants submitted by 31 provincial-level administrative divisions (PLADs) and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) was conducted to assess the accuracy and timeliness of SARS-CoV-2 variant surveillance. Results: From September 26, 2022 to January 29, 2023, 20,013 valid genome sequences of domestic cases were reported in China, with 72 evolutionary branches. Additionally, 1,978 valid genome sequences of imported cases were reported, with 169 evolutionary branches. The prevalence of the Omicron variants of SARS-CoV-2 in both domestic and imported cases was consistent with that of international epidemic variants. Conclusions: This study provides an overview of the prevalence of Omicron variants of SARS-CoV-2 in China. After optimizing COVID-19 prevention and control strategies, no novel Omicron variants of SARS-CoV-2 with altered biological characteristics or public health significance have been identified since December 1, 2022.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in November 2022.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in February 2022.
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Introduction: The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Omicron variant is the dominant circulating strain worldwide. To assess the importation of SARS-CoV-2 variants in the mainland of China during the Omicron epidemic, the genomic surveillance data of SARS-CoV-2 from imported coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases in the mainland of China during the first half of 2022 were analyzed. Methods: Sequences submitted from January to July 2022, with a collection date before June 30, 2022, were incorporated. The proportions of SARS-CoV-2 variants as well as the relationships between the origin and destination of each Omicron imported case were analyzed. Results: 4,946 sequences of imported cases were submitted from 27 provincial-level administrative divisions (PLADs), and the median submission interval was within 1 month after collection. In 3,851 Omicron sequences with good quality, 1 recombinant (XU) and 4 subvariants under monitoring (BA.4, BA.5, BA.2.12.1, and BA.2.13) were recorded, and 3 of them (BA.4, BA.5, and BA.2.12.1) caused local transmissions in the mainland of China later than that recorded in the surveillance. Omicron subvariants dominated in the first half of 2022 and shifted from BA.1 to BA.2 then to BA.4 and BA.5. The percentage of BA.2 in the imported SARS-CoV-2 surveillance data was far higher than that in the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID). The imported cases from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, accounted for 32.30% of Omicron cases sampled, and 98.71% of them were BA.2. Conclusions: The Omicron variant showed the intra-Omicron evolution in the first half of 2022, and all of the Omicron subvariants were introduced into the mainland of China multiple times from multiple different locations.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in October 2022.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in March 2022.
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Kashgar is a prefecture in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. China. Kashgar Prefecture (KP) is a land-cargo port connecting China with central Asian countries and Europe. Frequent transportation of cargo has increased the risk of severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) introduction into China, which has increased the pressure on coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) prevention and control. In November 2020, an imported virus-induced COVID-19 outbreak occurred in KP. To investigate the genetic characterization of SARS-CoV-2 that contaminated the trucks and containers, and the potential of border rapid logistics system to serve as carriers for SARS-CoV-2 transmission, thirty-five SARS-CoV-2-positive nucleic-acid samples collected from KP cross-border trucks and containers from 6-10 November 2020 were subjected into SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing and comparative analyses. The results showed that the median (minimum to maximum) Ct value of ORF1ab was 37.64 (28.91-39.81) . and that of the N gene was 36.50 (26.35-39.30), and the median (minimum to maximum) of the reads mapping ratio to SARS-CoV-2 was 51.95% (0.86%-99.31%), which indicated low viral loads in these environmental samples. Eighteen of 35 samples had genomic coverage >70%. According to the Pango nomenclature, 18 SARS-CoV-2 sequences belonged to six lineages (B.1, B.I.1, B.1.9. B.1.1.220, B.1.153 and B.1.465), three of which (B.I. B.1.1 and 8.1.153) were found in case samples from the same period of four China-neighboring countries. Analyses of nucleotide mutations and phylogenetic trees showed that the genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2 collected from the same location were similar. Four of 18 sequences were in a sub-lineage with the representative strain of COVID-19 outbreak in KP, one of which had 1 or 2 differences in nucleotide mutation sites with the strain that caused the COVID-19 outbreak in KP, which indicated high homology in the viral genome. We showed that cross-border trucks and containers were contaminated by various genotypes of SARS-CoV-2 from other countries during the outbreak in KP. and in which contained the parental virus of the KP cases. These trucks and containers served as carriers for SARS-CoV-2 introduction from other countries to cause local transmission. Our results provide important references for COVID-19 prevention-and-control strategies in border ports and tracing of outbreak sources in China.
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On December 15, 2020, four dock workers tested positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus 2 (SARS-COV-2) nucleic acids and were reported by Dalian. Up until then, Dalian City had not reported local cases for 136 consecutive days. In this coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak (referred to as the "Dalian COVID-19 outbreak"), samples from all infected persons (83) and part from the ship cargoes in contact With them during December 15, 2020 to January 8, 2021 were collected. Confirmed cases accounted for 61.45% (51/83) and asymptomatic infections accounted for 38.55% (32/83). Through high-throughput sequencing, 76 SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequences were obtained, of which 72 (86.75%) were from clinical samples, and 4 from cold-chain food packaging surface samples on cargo ship A of country R. Refer to Wuhan reference strain (NC_045512), genome analysis revealed 12-16 nucleotide mutations in 76 whole genomes sharing 12 nucleotide mutations and belong to the SARS-CoV-2 branch of B.1.1. Viral genomics and field epidemiological investigations showed that the Dalian COVID-19 outbreak was a local epidemic caused by dock workers infected with imported cold - chain products contaminated with SARS - CoV - 2. During transmission, 3 Virus generations and three relatively independent transmission chains were formed.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, including both indigenous and imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in June 2022.
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Introduction: After the epidemic in Wuhan City was brought under control in 2020, local outbreaks of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the mainland of China were mainly due to imported COVID-19 cases. The ongoing evolution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has continued to generate new variants. Some have been designated as variants of concern (VOCs) by the World Health Organization (WHO). To better assess the role of imported SARS-CoV-2 surveillance and the prevalence of VOCs in 2021, the genomic surveillance data of SARS-CoV-2 from imported COVID-19 cases of 2021 in the mainland of China were analyzed. Methods: The analyses included the number of sequence submissions, time of sequence deposition, and time of detection of the VOCs in order to determine the timeliness and sensitivity of the surveillance. The proportions of VOCs were analyzed and compared with data from the Global Initiative of Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID). Results: A total of 3,355 sequences of imported cases were submitted from 29 provincial-level administrative divisions, with differences in the number of sequence submissions and median time of sequence deposition. A total of 2,388 sequences with more than 90% genomic coverage were used for lineage analysis. The epidemic trend from Alpha to Delta to Omicron in imported cases was consistent with that in the GISAID. In addition, VOCs from imported cases were usually identified after WHO designation and before causing local outbreaks. Conclusions: The global distribution of SARS-CoV-2 VOCs changed rapidly in 2021. Robust genomic surveillance of the imported SARS-CoV-2 in the mainland of China is of great significance.
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Low temperature and certain humidity are conducive to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) for long-time survival and long-distance spread during logistics and trades. Contaminated cold-chain or frozen products and outer packaging act as the carrier of SARS-CoV-2, that infects the high-risk population who works in the ports, cold storage or seafood market. Since the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic worldwide, multiple localized outbreaks caused by SARS-CoV-2 contaminated imported cold-chain products have been reported in China, which brought challenges to COVID-19 prevention and control. Here, we review the evidences of SARS-CoV-2 cold-chain transmission from six confirmed cold-chain related COVID-19 outbreaks in China, especially in terms of SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing and virus isolation. In addition, we summarize the characteristics and mode of SARS-CoV-2 cold-chain transmission from both six COVID-19 outbreaks in China and the outbreaks suspected cold-chain transmission in other countries. Finally, we analyze the underlying risks of SARS-CoV-2 cold-chain transmission and propose the preventive countermeasures.
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COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/epidemiology , Disease Outbreaks , Humans , Pandemics/prevention & control , Risk FactorsABSTRACT
Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in October 2021.
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Accordings to the Pango nomenclature, a total of 1 379 lineages of SARS-CoV-2 have been identified worldwide as of 20 September 2021. Some lineages have disappeared or are close to disappearing due to the replacement by the variants with higher transmissibility and/or immune escape ability. The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined 4 variants of concern (VOC), 5 variants of interest (VOI) and 11 variants belonging to variants under monitoring (VUM). At present, the Delta variant has replaced the Alpha variant as the predominant global pandemic strain, and it is also the main variant detected in imported cases and local epidemics recently in China. Meanwhile, the Gamma and Lambda variants reported in some countries of South America, the Mu variant reported in some countries of South America and North America, and the C.1.2 variant reported in South Africa have also attracted high attention worldwide. The paper summarizes the variation of SARS-CoV-2 genome and the research progress of key variants of SARS-CoV-2 and put forward the key points of further research based on the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in September 2021.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in August 2021.
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Objective: To assess the risk of public health emergencies, both the indigenous ones and the imported ones, which might occur in the mainland of China in July 2021.